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REASON-Continental T.V.,

DETERMINED

UNDER RULE OF

Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.

36 (1977).

In 1962, GTE Sylvania Inc. (Sylvania) was engaged in the manufacture and sale of television sets. l Due to its rather limited share
of the television market, 2 Sylvania attempted to increase its sales
through the adoption of a "selective distribution policy." 3 This process utilized a franchise system 4 through which it was hoped selected
authorized dealers would be induced to efficiently promote and sell

1 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980,982 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 433
U.S. 36 (1977).
2 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Following World War II, television sales were dominated by RCA. RCA
controlled 60 to 70% of a market comprised of 130 other manufacturers including Sylvania.
Although Sylvania's share of this market had never been significant, the company became concerned when, by 1962, its market share had diminished to a mere one to two percent. 537 F.2d
at 982 & n.2.
1 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 982-83 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Sylvania, along with its competitors, had previously employed a "saturation
distribution" process. 537 F.2d at 982-83. Under this method, an unlimited number of Sylvania's products were channeled through independent and manufacturer-owned distributorships
and made available to any dealer desiring to market the product at any given location. The goal
of the procedure "was to generate as much volume as possible." Id. at 982. The selective
distribution program which replaced the saturation process was more discriminating in that
wholesale and factory distributorships were supplanted by a "'straight line distribution"' procedure through which Sylvania sold its products directly to franchised dealers. Id. at 983. For a
discussion of selective and saturation distribution, see Note, Restricted Channels of Distribution
under the Sherman Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 795, 795-96 (1962).
4 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Sylvania employed a franchising arrangement whereby the manufacturer
selected particular wholesalers or retailers to market its product in return for their cooperation
in managing their businesses according to standards set by the manufacturer. See 537 F.2d at
983. See also Comment, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions in the FranchisingIndustry, 10 COLUM. J. L. & Soc. PROB. 497, 498 (1974).
In designing the franchise policy, Sylvania had made special attempts to comply with antitrust standards: dealers were not given exclusive territories, nor could they override any decision by Sylvania to franchise other dealers in a given area; dealers were free to sell to any
customers, 537 F.2d at 983, and were not prohibited from selling the products of Sylvania's
competitors. 433 U.S. at 38 n.3 (1977). For a general discussion of franchising relationships, see
Kintner, Distribution Restrictions in Franchise Agreements-As Viewed By A Member Of The
Private Bar, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1211 (1967); Pollock, Antitrust Problems in Franchising, 15
N.Y.L.F. 106 (1969); Pollock, Franchising, Customer Restrictions, and Building a Better
Mousetrap, 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 381 (1965).
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Sylvania products. 5 Fundamental to the new franchise scheme was a
location restriction 6 under which participating dealers were effectively prohibited from moving Sylvania merchandise from one location to another for subsequent marketing unless Sylvania had previ7
ously sanctioned the transfer.
Continental T.V., Inc. (Continental) 8 was granted franchises at
various locations within the state of California by Sylvania in May,
1964. 9 Subsequent to the franchise agreement, a financing arrangement, known as the " 'Maguire plan,' " was initiated among Sylvania,
Continental, and John P. Maguire & Co., Inc., a financing company. 10 This arrangement-provided that Sylvania would be liable to
Maguire should Continental repudiate its obligations."
In March, 1965, Sylvania was advised of Continental's desire to
expand its operations into the Sacramento market. 12 Continental,
however, did not advise Sylvania of the selected location, a site in
close proximity to an existing Sylvania franchise outlet. 13 In early

I

GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
n GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), aff d,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The location restriction stipulated that authorized Sylvania dealers could sell
Sylvania products only at locations designated and approved by Sylvania. 537 F.2d at 983.
7 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 983 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
s GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Continental is an assemblage of several corporations commonly owned,
which has operated as a retailer of radios and televisions since 1960. 537 F.2d at 984.
1 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd.
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Continental opened its first franchise in 1960 in San Jose, California. 537
F.2d at 984. By 1965, Continental had increased the number of franchises to eight, including
retail outlets in the areas of San Francisco, Santa Clara, San Mateo and Alameda. Id.
10 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Under the "'Maguire plan,"' John P. Maguire & Co., Inc., a national
finance corporation, secured payment for the Sylvania inventory obtained by Continental. Continental would reimburse Maguire either at the time the product was sold or six months after
the date of delivery to Continental, if Continental still had the merchandise in its inventory. 537
F.2d at 984. Continental had never employed any financing arrangements for its inventory
before dealing with Sylvania. Transactions with customers who preferred installment payments
were managed by a nearby San Jose bank. Id.
11 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). As a corollary to this obligation, Sylvania retained some degree of control
over the level of credit available to Continental. 537 F.2d 984.
12 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Sacramento area had proved to be very profitable for Sylvania. By 1965
it had provided Sylvania with a market share of over 15%. 433 U.S. at 39 n.6. At the same
time, the sales volume of Continental aflliates was over $1,000,000, making Continental one of
Sylvania's most successful retailers. 537 F.2d at 984 n.5.
13 See GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). This proposed new dealership was to be located approximately one
mile from Handy Andy, a previously franchised Sylvania dealer. 537 F.2d at 984.
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September, 1965, Continental filed a franchise application for the
new dealership. 14 Despite Sylvania's refusal to grant authorization to
the dealership, 15 Continental transferred Sylvania goods to the Sacramento outlet. 16 Sale of these Sylvania products in the new retail
store commenced on September 7, 1965.17
The deteriorating relationship between Sylvania and Continental
had been previously strained in June, 1965 when Young Brothers, a
dealer franchised by Sylvania, was granted a location near a Continental outlet in San Francisco. 18 Although Continental vigorously
protested Sylvania's authorization of another dealership so near its
own, Sylvania was not dissuaded.1 9 As a result of Sylvania's refusal
to reconsider the Young Brothers franchise grant, Continental cancelled a substantial order which it had previously placed with Sylvania. 2 0 Concurrent with this cancellation, Continental entered into
a half-million dollar contract with Philco, a competitor of Sylvania,
and placed Sylvania on notice that in the future it would decrease its
21
orders for Sylvania televisions.
Professing anxiety over Continental's unstable financial condition, 2 2 Sylvania decreased Continental's operational credit limit to

14 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Acknowledging Sylvania's policy requiring its advance approval before the
opening of any new franchise, Continental notified Sylvania of its plans to oper the Sacramento
retail outlet. 537 F.2d at 984.
15GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental TV., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984-85 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
16GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). In refusing the franchise, Sylvania contended that the area already had an
ample number of dealerships. 537 F.2d at 984-85.
17 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
18GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The Young Brothers outlet was located approximately one mile from a
Continental franchise. 537 F.2d at 984.
19GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Continental believed such close proximity between its own outlet and
another Sylvania daler infringed upon the objectives of selective distribution and was "violat[ive] [of] the spacing concept underlying the 'elbow room policy."' 537 F.2d at 984; see notes
5-6 supra and accompanying text.
20 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
21 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), affd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
22 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental TV., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Apparently, Sylvania's credit department had been provided with an uncomplimentary Dun & Bradstreet profile concerning the principal shareholder of Continental
who also occupied a position as chief operating officer. 537 F.2d at 985. According to the statement, this shareholder possessed "a military conviction ... for misappropriation of government
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$50,000.23 Continental responded by refusing to compensate
Maguire for debts outstanding on Sylvania merchandise. 2 4 These actions eventually resulted in a dissolution of the franchise relationship
25
between Continental and Sylvania.
Upon Continental's refusal to tender the amounts outstanding
under the financing agreement, Maguire filed a complaint against
Continental to obtain a judgment for payments due. 26 In response to
Maguire's suit, Continental instituted antitrust and tort cross-claims
against Maguire and Sylvania. 2 7 Continental requested damages
from both Maguire and Sylvania, and injunctive relief against the latter to prevent enforcement of the limitation on resale of Sylvania
28
merchandise from any location not authorized by that corporation.
The district court absolved Maguire of any antitrust infractions, 2 9
but found that Sylvania's imposition of the location clause constituted
a per se violation of section one of the Sherman Act. 30 Relying upon
the standards enunciated by the Supreme Court in United States v.

funds and issuing worthless checks." Id. Sylvania was also distressed about Continental's delinquency in meeting payments to Maguire. Id. In addition, Continental had substantial financial
responsibilities to Philco, a competing television manufacturer, which included a loan and a
contract for Philco merchandise. Id.
23 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Continental's previous credit limit had been $300,000. 537 F.2d at 985.
24 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Over the three week period during which Continental withheld payment, a
$62,000 unsecured debt was accumulated. 537 F.2d at 985.
25 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
26 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). Pursuant to the filed complaint, Continental's bank accounts were attached
by Maguire. 537 F.2d at 985. Repossession efforts were also made for any Sylvania goods still
held by Continental. Id. Continental's stores and central warehouse located in San Jose were
then shut down and the bank Continental had dealt with "terminated Continental's consumer
financing program and called for the payment of a commercial loan." Id.
27 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The tort claim which, under California law, alleged that Continental suffered injury to its business and property, was resolved by the jury in favor of Maguire and
Sylvania. 537 F.2d at 985-86.
28 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977); see notes 6-7 supra and accompanying text.
29 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 984 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The jury found Maguire "had not engaged [with Sylvania] in a combination,
contract or conspiracy" resulting in an illegal restraint of trade under antitrust law. 537 F.2d at
985-86.
'0 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985-86 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Section one of the Sherman Act provides in pertinent part that: "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
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Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,3 1 the district court found that distribution
restrictions placed on goods where title, dominion and risk of loss had
already passed were illegal as a matter of law. 32 Damages were assessed by the jury at $591,505.33 Pursuant to section fifteen of the
Clayton Act, 34 the court trebled the jury assessment3 and entered a
judgment against Sylvania amounting to $1,774,515. 5
36
The Ninth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court,
viewing that decision to be based upon a misinterpretation of
Schwinn. 3 7 In so holding, the court felt Schwinn was clearly distinguishable from the case in Sylvania. 38 The court determined a "rule
31 388 U.S. 365, 379 (1967). For a discussion of the Schwinn case, see notes 85-104 infra
and accompanying text.
32 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 987 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The district court granted Continental "a limited injunction" which prohibited Sylvania from implementing its location restriction. 537 F.2d at 987.
33 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 985-86 & n.6 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
- 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). This section provides that "[a]ny person who shall be injured in
his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws .. .shall recover
Id.
threefold the damages by him sustained.
35 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977).
38 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1004 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The case was first heard by a three judge panel which affirmed the district
court's analysis using the Schwinn rationale. 1974-1 Trade Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir. May 9, 1974).
However, the opinion was withdrawn and the arguments were reheard en banc. 1974-1 Trade
Cas. 75,072 (9th Cir. May 9, 1974), petition for rehearingen banc granted, No. 71-1705 (9th
Cir. Dec. 12, 1974). For a discussion of the original Ninth Circuit opinion, see Comment,
Schwinn Recycled-Enforced Restrictions On Location of Franchise Retail Outlets Held a Per
Se Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 957 (1974); Note, Antitrust
Law-Enforcement of Dealer-Location Clauses Declared Per Se Illegal, 53 N.C. L. REV. 775
(1975); Note, Antitrust-Vertical Restraints-Schwinn "Per Se" Doctrine Extended to Location
Clauses, 53 TEx. L. REv. 127 (1974).
37 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). In the opinion of the court, the district court's application of Schwinn was
"inconsistent with the existing law permitting exclusive dealership and ... would seriously
undermine, rather than implement, the major purpose of the Sherman Act." 537 F.2d at 988.
3 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 988-91 (9th Cir. 1976), aff'd,
433 U.S. 36 (1977). The court found Sylvania could be distinguished from Schwinn in that the
territorial restrictions in Schwinn were applicable to the location of vendees, rather than vendors, as was the case in Sylvania. 537 F.2d at 989-90. While intrabrand competition had been
"wholly destroyed" in Schwinn, the court determined that in Sylvania intrabrand competition
had been "preserv[edl." Id. at 990. In addition, the court considered the fact that the market
share which Sylvania was to increase was considerably smaller at the outset of the implementation of the distribution restrictions than was the market share Schwinn held when it instituted
its marketing program. Id. at 991. Finally, emphasizing the fact that location clauses may enhance rather than destroy competition, the court did not find a "net anticompetitive effect" from
the enforcement of Sylvania's location restriction. Id. at 1000. The court also feared that a
finding of per se illegality of location clauses would undermine franchising relationships to the
detriment of small independent businessmen. Id. at 999.
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of reason" standard should be employed in assessing the legality of
the location clause. 39 The United States Supreme Court granted
Continental's petition for certiorari, 40 and in Continental T.V., Inc. v.
GTE Sylvania Inc. ,41 the Court held the rule of reason is the proper
standard to use in determining whether a vertical restraint is a lawful
marketing practice. 4 2 Emphasizing the economic impact of distribution restrictions, the Court rejected the facial evaluation used in
Schwinn in favor of the rule of reason standard utilizing factors indicative of the effect which the restraint has on competition. 43 Through
the application of such a standard the Court overruled the per se rule
presented in Schwinn and its application to restraints on distribu44
tion.
The Sherman Act of 1890 (Act) 4 5 was the product of public sentiment decrying the power and profits of giant business organizations. 4 6 The Act was designed to foster economic competition and
effectively minimize anti-competitive practices by prohibiting any
contract, combination . . . or conspiracy . . . in restraint of

39 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 1000-14 (9th Cir. 1976),
aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977). Used in antitrust analysis to determine the legality of certain business
practices, the rule of reason evaluates factors denotative of the effect which the restraint has on
competition. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 64-65 (1911). For a general
discussion of the rule of reason and the Standard Oil Case, see notes 48-49, 59-68 infra and
accompanying text.
40 GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V., Inc., 537 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
429 U.S. 893 (1976), aff'd, 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
41 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
42 Id. at 57-59.
43 Id.
at 58-59. For a more detailed discussion of the economic impact test and other factors, see notes 121-35 infra and accompanying text.
44 433 U.S. at 58-59.
45 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
46 See E. HUNT, PROPERTY AND PROPHETS 103-06 (2d ed. 1972).
Rapid industrialization following the Civil War resulted in the ascendance of mammoth
business organizations. This growth and consequential desire for absolute monopolization of each
business sector led to "industrial warfare" to the detriment of the consumer, who ultimately
bore the higher costs of products and services. See id. at 103-04.
Organizations such as the National Grange and the National Farmer's Alliance effectively
protested the political and economic influence exerted by these industries. Of special concern
was the railroad industry, which affected farmers' transportation costs and, ultimately, profits.

See A.

NEALE, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

12 (2d ed. 1970).

The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, proscribing rate discrimination to any railroad, represented a major effort to curtail the excesses of big business. Id. In 1888; an election year, the
major political parties reacted against the monopolistic propensities of industry, culminating in
the passage of the Sherman Act two years later. Id.; see E. HUNT, supra at 105. For an indepth historical study of the Sherman Act, see H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLicy 164-225 (1955).
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trade." 47 Literally construed, the Act would hold every "restraint of
trade" to be illegal. 48 Traditionally, however, the statute has been
interpreted as invalidating only unreasonable restraints.4 9 In this regard, the Court has found certain business practices to be unreasonable as a matter of law, thus meriting a per se ruling as to their
illegality. 50 Dealing primarily with threshold level questions of fact,
41 Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1977); see A. AUSTIN, ANTITRUST: LAW, ECONOMICS, POLIcy, § 3.2 (1976); C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 17-20 (1965).

It is interesting to note that although passage of the Sherman Act seemed to indicate strong
support for its immediate utilization, early enforcement efforts were minimal. A. NEALE, supra
note 36, at 16. It was thirteen years before additional funds were granted to the Justice Department for "enforcement" purposes. Id. Government authorities also acted in a dilatory manner in bringing suit against any transgressors of the Act. Id. Moreover, of the first seven cases
brought by the Government, six ended in acquittal. Id.
48 The term "restraint of trade" has origins dating back to common law. See H. THORELLI,
supra note 46, at 17. Because of the broad scope and complexity of antitrust regulation, a
precise definition of what constitutes a restraint of trade is virtually impossible. A. NEALE,
supra note 46, at 18-20. Recognizing these limitations, however, A.D. Neale contends that the
term might be broadly defined as "action by private businessmen to prevent some form of
competition from operating in the market." Id. at 19 n.1. At the time of the adoption of the
Sherman Act, the phrase was one which was familiar to attorneys and lawmakers and thought to
be commonly understood within the legal community. Id. at 13-15. Recognizing that the Act,
on its face, expressly prohibited all restraints, the Court in United States v. Trans-Missouri
Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897), found a literal interpretation of section one of the Sherman
Act to be appropriate, irrespective of the common law practice of invalidating only unreasonable
restraints of trade. Id. at 327-28; accord, United States v. Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505
(1898). See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAv OF ANTITRUST §§ 64-65, at

167-72 (1977).
49 See, e.g., Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
The adherence by the courts to a strict standard of interpretation of the Sherman Act was
not, however, universally accepted. Indeed, one year after the decision in Trans-Missouri
Freight, Judge Taft of the Sixth Circuit enunciated the view that only unreasonable restraints of
trade were illegal under the statute. United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271
(6th Cir. 1898); see E. KINTNER, AN ANTITRUST PRIMER 17 (2d ed. 1973); A. NEALE, supra

note 46, at 13-16; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 167-71. In Standard Oil Co. v. United
States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), the Supreme Court adopted the "rule of reason" standard which
specifically uses reasonableness as the criterion to decide the legality of a restraint of trade. Id.
at 64-6; see E. KINTNER, supra at 21-22. Standard Oil and thirty-six other corporations had
been charged with combining in restraint of trade (a section one violation of the Sherman Act)
and monopolizing (a section two violation). Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 31-32; see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 172-73. The Court, however, acknowledged that prior cases, such as
Trans-Missouri and Joint Traffic, which had not recognized a rule of reason approach were still
viable, as they involved restraints which merited a finding of illegality regardless of their
reasonableness. 221 U.S. at 64-68.
50 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 65 (1911); see, e.g., International Salt Co.
v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying arrangements found to be per se illegal); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts of industry
combinations constitute unfair method of competition; United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing held per se illegal); Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211 (1889) (division of markets agreement determined to be direct restraint of
interstate commerce). See generally A. NEALE, supra note 46, at 27-29; C. KAYSEN & D.
TURNER, supra note 47, at 142-44; E. KINTNER, supra note 49, at 20-21.
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the per se approach does not require any investigation into the
economic aspects of the practice. 5 1
Utilizing the per se rule, the Court, in Northern Pacific Railway
Co. v. United States 52 examined a "tying arrangement" 5 3 through
which Northern Pacific provided that any sale or lease of its land
would be contingent upon an agreement that the parties use Northern Pacific railroad lines to ship any of their products. 54 In evaluating the legality of this arrangement, the Court enunciated the standard that a restraint would be deemed illegal per se if found to have
a "pernicious effect on competition and lack[ing] ... any redeeming
virtue."55 In pronouncing this standard, the Court declared that a
per se ruling would eliminate the burdensome need for an investigation into the historical and economic circumstances of the particular
56
case, which "so often . . . [proved] fruitless when undertaken."
Applying this criterion, the Court found that the effect of the arrangement was so deleterious as to warrant a per se ruling. 5 7 Fundamental to this ruling was the Court's desire to establish a
framework of review which would ensure predictability in future judicial evaluations of possible violations arising under the Sherman
Act. 58
5' A. NEALE, supra note 46, at 27. Where a per se unreasonable restraint is involved, a
judicial proceeding may concern itself only with questions of fact as to whether the restraint
actually occurred. Id. In defense to allegations of a per se violation, a business will not be
permitted to "challenge the presumption in favour of competition." Id. Assertions that the contested action worked no public harm or, in fact, actually facilitated competition will be excluded
by the court. Id. at 27-28. See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, VERTICAL
RESTRICTIONS LIMITING INTRABRAND COMPETITION 31 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION,

MONOGRAPH No. 2].

52 356 U.S. 1 (1958).

11 Id. at 5. A tying arrangement is a device employed by a seller in which the purchase or
lease of one particular product is conditioned upon the sale or lease of another product, or the
prohibition on buying such other product from a competitor. Id. at 5-6; see E. KINTNER, supra
note 49, at 47. Generally, a seller will utilize such an arrangement to obtain a greater market
share for a product with a lesser consumer preference. E. KINTNER, sipra note 49, at 47. For a
general discussion of tying arrangements, see id. at 47-59.
54 356 U.S. at 3. Northern Pacific's agreement also provided that, if a competing railroad
offered better services or lower rates, the parties to these agreements could utilize those services or rates. Id. See also L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at § 157, 454-56.
55 356 U.S. at 5.
56 Id. For further discussion of the per se rule, see Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per
Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 75 YALE L. J. 373, 378-87 (1966).
5' 356 U.S. at 7-8. Emphasizing Northern Pacific's maintenance of "substantial economic
power," together with the involvement of "a 'not insubstantial' amount of interstate commerce,"
the Court held that the nature of the tying agreement mandated a per se finding of illegality.
Id. at 7.
58 See id. at 5. For a discussion of the need for certainty as to businessmen and the legal
community, see Stedman, A New Look at Antitrust: The Report of the Attorney General's
Committee, 4 J. PUB. L. 223, 260-62 (1955).
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In contrast to the facial evaluation employed in cases involving
per se violations, other business practices have necessitated a more
discriminating analysis of their effects on competition. 5 9 Recognition
of this necessity resulted in the adoption by the Court of a rule of
reason standard under which a wide range of factors relative to a
restraint's character and market effects would be considered in de60
termining the legality of a particular arrangement.
The rule of reason and its proper application was examined by
the Supreme Court in Chicago Board of Trade v. United States. 6 1 In
an effort to stabilize trading hours, the Chicago Board of Trade
adopted a "'Call' rule" which prohibited after-hours trading on the
exchange at any price other than the final bid at the close of the
session. 62 In reply to the Government's challenge of the legality of
the rule, Justice Brandeis acknowledged that all business agreements
impinge to some extent upon competition. 63 In this regard, Justice
Brandeis declared that the determination as to whether a particular
business arrangement would constitute an illegal restraint was dependent upon its overall effect on competition.64 In evaluating the legality of the exchange's trading restriction, the Court outlined certain
factors which should be considered in determining the extent to
which competition has been inhibited. 65 Among the considerations
emphasized by the Court were the effects of the restraint on the industry, the characteristics of the restraint, and an analysis of the particular industry involved. 66 Although the Court recognized it would
59 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 66 (1911). See also Tampa Elec. Co.
v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (legality of requirements contract viewed under rule
of reason).
60 See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); A. NEALE, supra note 46, at
20-27.
61 246 U.S. 231, 238-39 (1918).
2 Id. at 237. Prior to the institution of the "'Call' rule," bids were in a state of constant

change during the entire day. This not only inhibited "the convenience of members," but allowed a certain group of warehousemen in Chicago to perpetuate a monopoly in grain dealings.
id.
63 Id. at 238. For further discussion of the Chicago Board of Trade decision, see generally
A. NEALE, supra note 46, at 21-22; L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 175-79.
64 246 U.S. at 238-39; see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at 176-78. See generally A. NEALE,

supra note 46, at 21-23.
65 246 U.S. at 238.
66 Id. For examples of various factors which courts have reviewed, see, e.g., The TimesPicayune Pub. Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 614-15 (1953) (effect of restraint); United
States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 527-28, rehearing denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948)
(market share); Sugar Inst. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600-02 (1936) (effect of restraint in
specific industry); United States v. Insurance Bd., 188 F. Supp. 949, 955 (N.D. Ohio 1960)
(degree of restraint); United States v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 137 F. Supp. 78, 84
(S.D. Cal. 1956) (reason for adopting restraint).
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be appropriate to review those factors evincing the intention of the
parties, Justice Brandeis indicated that intent alone would not be determinative of the legality of the restraint. 6 7 Such considerations of
intent would aid the Court in only evaluating the reasonableness of
the overall arrangement.68
Restraints have been found to be illegal because of their detrimental effect on competition under both per se and rule of reason
approaches. 6 9 There are several arrangements which affect competition in differing ways. Business restraints within a particular market
have -been categorized as vertical or horizontal depending upon
whether they are contained within a single organizational structure or
extend laterally into other competing business associations. 70 A horizontal restraint involves an agreement between competitors at the
same level of production or distribution, such as an arrangement between manufacturers. 7 1 Business arrangements among companies at
different stages of production or distribution are classified as vertical,
as illustrated by an agreement between a manufacturer and distributor. 72 The Supreme Court has traditionally viewed horizontal
restraints as unreasonable per se since such restrictions reduce competition in the participating industry. 73 Although vertical restraints
67 246 U.S. at 238-39.
68 Id.; see, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 702-03 (1967),

rehearing denied, 387 U.S. 949, on remand, 396 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1968); United States v.
Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 524-25, rehearing denied, 334 U.S. 862 (1948); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 58-59 (1911); Philadelphia Record Co. v. Manufacturing
Photo-Engravers Ass'n, 155 F.2d 799, 803 (3d Cir. 1946).
69 See generally, Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320 (1961) (requirements
contract upheld under rule of reason); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947) (tying arrangement found per se illegal); Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v.
F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (group boycotts found per se illegal); United States v. SoconyVacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing found per se illegal); Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918) (trade restriction upheld under rule of reason).
70 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963) (manufacturer imposed vertical restriction upon distributors and dealers); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (group of major oil companies effectuated a horizontal price-fixing agreement).
For a general discussion of vertical and horizontal restraints, see ABA ANTITRUST SECTION,
MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 51, at 1-6, 43-47; Bork, supra note 56, at 391-429.
71 P. AREEDA,

ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 260 (2d ed. 1974); E. KINTNER, supra note 49, at

42-43. For examples of per se illegal horizontal arrangements, see United States v. Topco
Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972) (division of market by competitors held per se unlawful); Fashion
Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941) (boycott conducted by competitors
found per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 140 (1940) (price-fixing
among competitors found per se illegal).
72 See White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963); P. AREEDA, supra note 71,
at 498-99; E. KINTNER, supra note 49, at 43-46, L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, § 130, at 37677.
7' See, e.g., Fashion Originators' Guild of America, Inc. v. F.T.C., 312 U.S. 457 (1941)
(group boycotts by manufacturers found per se illegal); United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil
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restrict competition to a certain extent, their beneficial effects may
outweigh this limitation.74 While a vertical restraint will curtail, if
not eliminate, intrabrand competition-competition between distributors of the same manufacturer's product- it may concurrently
increase interbrand competition-competition between manufacturers of the same type of product. 75 Therefore, when confronted with
a vertical arrangement, the courts have often applied the rule of
reason analysis since the arrangements are often not as facially detri76
mental as their horizontal counterparts.
The legitimacy of vertical customer and territorial restrictions
was first addressed by the Supreme Court in White Motor Co. v.
United States. 77 The White Motor Co., a truck manufacturing firm,
Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (price-fixing found per se illegal); United States v, Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), affd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899) (division of markets found per se
illegal). See also E. KINTNER, supra note 49, at 42-43; A. NEALE, supra note 46, at 63-64.
74 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 51, at 1-6. See also Preston, Restrictive Distribution Arrangements: Economic Analysis and Public Policy Standards, 30
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506, 511-12 (1965). But see Comanor, Vertical Territorialand Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its Aftermath, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1968). For a
discussion of the detrimental effects of vertical restraints, see notes 125-28 infra and accompanying text.
15 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 51, at 1-6 (1977). See
also, Bork, supra note 46, at 472-73; Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition Decisions,
75 COLUM. L. REV. 282, 283-85 (1975); Preston, supra note 74, at 511.
76 See, e.g., Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339 F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964); Snap-On Tools Corp. v.
F.T.C., 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963); Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822
(2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943).
"7 372 U.S. 253, 261 (1963). Generally, a vertical customer restraint is a manufacturerimposed restriction which limits the class of customers, such as the government, distributors,
retailers or consumers, to whom a distributor or retailer may sell. A vertical territorial restraint,
also imposed by the manufacturer, restricts geographically the area in which a distributor or
retailer may sell the product. See Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An Analysis and
Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.F. 39, 41 n.10 (1969); Comment, Restricted DistributionAfter "Schwinn,"
9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 1032, 1042-46 (1967); Note, supra note 3, 75 HARV. L. REV. at
795-97. More specifically, territorial restraints are not limited to restrictions such as closed
territorial clauses in which sales outside defined geographic boundaries are strictly prohibited.
See Averill, supra at 51 n.10; Note, Territorial and Customer Restrictions: A Trend Toward a
Broader Rule of Reason?, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123, 124-25 (1971). Also included are less
restrictive arrangements such as profit pass-over clauses, primary areas of responsibility and
location clauses. A profit pass-over clause compels a dealer who sells outside his assigned territory to return to the dealer in whose territory he made the sale either all or a portion of his
profit. See Bennett, Vertical TerritorialRestraints: Do's and Don'ts for the Manufacturer with
Independent Distributors, 32 Bus. LAW. 1771, 1778-79 (1977); Comment, supra at 1042-43;
Note, supra note 3, 75 HARV. L. REV. at 814-17. Primary areas of responsibility are arrangements through which a dealer is encouraged to use his best efforts to sell the manufacturer's
product by use of a quota system or threat of franchise termination. See Bennett, supra at
1779-80; Comment, supra at 1042-46. Location clauses are arrangements through which manufacturers confine retail sellers of their goods to particular designated outlets. See Bennett,
supra at 1780-82; Louis, Vertical DistributionalRestraints Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An
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had a sales distribution program under which agreements restricting
sales territories and customer solicitation were made with wholesale
and retail dealers. 7 8 The territorial restraint prohibited dealers from
marketing White Motor trucks outside their assigned region. 79 The
customer restraint precluded dealers from selling any White Motor
merchandise to federal or state governments without specific approval
from the company.8 0 Since the district court had utilized a summary
judgment proceeding in determining that the restraints were per se
violations, 8 1 the Supreme Court found the record was insufficient to
determine the inherent unreasonableness of the restraints. 82 In remanding the case for a full hearing relative to the character of the
restraints, the court declared that without an inquiry into the intent
of White Motor and the effect of the restrictions, a court would be
unable to determine whether a per se rule or rule of reason approach
was appropriate for customer and territorial restraints. 83 The Court
found, however, that a per se approach would have been necessary if
the customer and territorial restraints had been an integral part of a

Argument for the Continuing Use of a PartialPer Se Approach, 75 MICH. L. REV. 275, 287-95
(1976); Comment, Location Clauses: Schwinn Versus Schwinn's Progeny, 29 BAYLOR L. REV.
119, 119 (1977).
78 White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253, 255-58 (1963). These restrictive agreements were included within form contracts, which were executed either directly between the
manufacturer and the dealer or indirectly between the wholesaler and the dealer. United States
v. White Motor Co., 194 F. Supp. 562, 565-66 (N.D. Ohio 1961), rev'd, 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
79 372 U.S. at 255-56. The sanction maintained by White Motor for breach of the territorial
restraint apparently was a profit pass-over provision and not a franchise termination. Id. at
270-71 & n.10 (Brennan, J., concurring).
80 Id. at 256-57. For a detailed discussion of the utilization of vertical customer restrictions,
see Note, supra note 3, 75 HARV. L. REV. at 817-23.
81 194 F. Supp. at 586-87, revd, 372 U.S. 253.

82 372 U.S. at 264. Justice Douglas, writing for the.majority, noted that a summary judgment proceeding was an appropriate forum in antitrust law in which to determine the presence
of particular restraints that had been ascertained to be per se illegal because "a trial to show
their nature, extent, and degree [was] no longer necessary." Id. at 259-60. The district court
had determined that a per se approach for vertical territorial and customer restraints was warranted and, therefore, entered a summary judgment. See 194 F. Supp. 562, 587-88 (N.D. Ohio
1961). In holding that this restraint would be categorized as a per se violation, the court relied
upon the analysis set forth in Northern Pacific emphasizing the deleterious effect of such restrictions on competition. Id. at 587; see Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5 (1957). For further discussion of the lower court proceedings, see Note, supra note 3, 75 HARV. L. REV. at 797-801.
83 372 U.S. at 261-63. Justice Clark dissented, along with Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Black, because he believed the record had been substantial enough at that point to decide the
case even though a summary judgment proceeding had been utilized. See id. at 280-82 (Clark,
Black, JJ., & Warren, C.J., dissenting). The dissenters had found the White Motor distribution
program to be "one of the most brazen violations of the Sherman Act . .. experienced in a
quarter of a century," id. at 276, and without "justification," id. at 281, thereby meriting a per
se declaration of illegality. See id. at 279, 281.
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price-fixing scheme imposed by White Motor on those who distrib84
uted its products.

The White Motor case was remanded but final adjudication came in the form of a consent
decree, not a trial. See United States v. White Motor Co., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (1964 Trade Cas.)
V 71,195 (N.D. Ohio, Sept. 8, 1964). The decree not only prohibited White Motor from continuing the distribution program, but also mandated cancellation of any contracts between distributors and White Motors which were inconsistent with the decree. Id. For further general
discussion of the White Motor case, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, § 143, at 402-03; Bennett,
supra note 77, at 1772; Comment, supra note 77, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. at 1034-36;
Note, supra note 77, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 127-28; Note, TerritorialRestrictions and Per
Se Rules-A Reevaluation of the Schwinn and Sealy Doctrines, 70 MICH. L. REV. 616, 618-20
(1972).
Prior to White Motor, the Second Circuit had sustained the validity of at least one type of
territorial restraint, location clauses. Boro Hall Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 124 F.2d 822,
823-24 (2d Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 695 (1943). In that case, the location clause under
review was agreed upon by General Motors, an automobile manufacturer, and the Boro Hall
Corp., an automobile dealership. 124 F.2d at 823. Boro Hall wished to open a used car outlet
outside its agreed upon "'Zone of Influence."' Id. General Motors, however, would not agree to
any location which it believed would be prejudicial to its other dealers. Id. Boro Hall claimed
this arrangement was a restraint of trade and instituted a treble damage suit under the Sherman
Act. Id. The court found the location clause was a reasonable business practice especially in
light of the fact that General Motors had retained the right to terminate the contract with the
dealer on thirty days' notice. Id.
White Motor was followed by the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Snap-On Tools Corp.
v. F.T.C., 321 F.2d 825 (7th Cir. 1963), wherein the court applied the rule of reason to vertical
territorial restraints. Snap-On Tools involved territorial restrictions in which franchise dealers
were given specific distribution routes, deemed essential to effective merchandising in the tool
industry, to sell Snap-On products. Id. at 829, 832. Sales were not restricted to certain customers provided that the sale was made in the dealer's assigned territory. Id. at 829. Accordingly,
salesmen were encouraged to solicit thoroughly along their assigned route. Id. The court found
the arrangements were reasonable due to the nature of the tool industry and the fact that
interbrand competition would be enhanced. Id. at 833, 837. For a further discussion of the
Snap-On decision, see Note, supra note 77, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REV. at 128-29; Note, supra,
70 MICH. L. REV. at 620-22.

Following the Snap-On Tools decision, the Sixth Circuit in Sandura Co. v. F.T.C., 339
F.2d 847 (6th Cir. 1964), applied the rule of reason to a territorial restraint which involved
agreement between Sandura and its distributors. Id. at 849-51. These agreements provided that
the distributors could only sell Sandura merchandise to retail dealers within their assigned
geographic area. Id. From the record, the court determined that the territorial restrictions were
reasonable since there was no indication that intrabrand competition was significantly impaired.
Id. Rather, the court concluded that overall interbrand competition was enhanced by the viable
competition in the product market now provided by Sandura. Id. at 858-59. An important
consideration by the court was the financial condition of Sandura. Id. at 850-51. Although the
court had not accepted Sandura's claim to be a "failing company," it had considered the fact that
Sandura had been near insolvency prior to the institution of one closed territory system due to a
product failure. Id. at 855-56. For further discussion of the Sandura decision, see Bennett,
supra note 77, at 1773; Preston, supra note 74, at 525-26; Note, supra note 77, 40 CEO.
WASH. L. REV. at 128-29; Note, supra, 70 MICH. L. REV. at 620-22.
84 372 U.S. at 261--64. Vertical price-fixing, in which the manufacturer determines the actual price, a minimum price or a maximum price at which a distributor or retailer will sell the
manufacturer's product, has been determined by the Supreme Court to be per se unreasonable.
United States v. Parke Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29, 43-47 (1960); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John
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Following White Motor, the Court again considered the legality
of vertical territorial and customer restraints in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.85 and determined that even in the absence of
price-fixing, such restraints warranted per se treatment under certain
circumstances. 8 6 Schwinn, a major bicycle manufacturing firm,
adopted a franchise system and implemented a varied distribution
program. 8 7 Distributors either bought bicycles from Schwinn for resale to dealers, or made agency or consignment arrangements with
retailers who received the merchandise directly from Schwinn. 8 s Alternatively, retailers could adopt the "Schwinn Plan" whereby they
received merchandise directly from Schwinn, who was responsible for
retailer invoices, credit arrangements and payments of commissions to
the distributor who solicited the order.89 All of these distribution
options entailed customer restrictions which prohibited any retailer
from selling or reselling Schwinn products to a non-franchised retailer
or distributor. 90 In addition, territorial restrictions confined distributors' sales activities to assigned areas. 9 1
D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 404-09 (1911); see 372 U.S. at 260. In United States v.
Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944), the Court expanded the per se doctrine to
encompass those vertical restraints which were integral to a price-fixing arrangement. id. at
719-21, 724. However, because of the insufficient record in White Motor, the Court was unable
to conclude whether the Bausch & Lomb doctrine would be applicable in order to find the
restraints per se illegal. 372 U.S. at 260-61, 264. For a more detailed discussion of vertical
price-fixing, see L. SULLIVAN, supra note 48, at §§ 131-41, 377-99; A. NEALE, supra note 46,
at 272-99. See also Posner, supra note 75, at 286-99 (1975); Bork, supra note 56, at 397-465.
85 388 U.S. at 379-80.
86 id.
at 375-79.
8I ld. at 370-71. In 1951, Schwinn possessed 22.5% of the bicycle market, which was "'the
largest single share of the United States bicycle market." Id. at 368. However, by 1961
Schwinn's market share had decreased to 12.8%, a level surpassed by its competitors. Id. at
368-69.
88 Id. at 369-70.
89 Id. The "Schwinn Plan" appeared to be the most popular method of distribution. See id.
at 370 n.3. At the time of the trial, approximately seventy-five percent of Schwinn's sales were
under the plan. Id. One probable reason for this popularity was the fact that by taking over
many of the traditional distributor duties, such as invoicing and arranging credit, the plan enabled distributors to increase sales volume without overextending their financial capacity. United
States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Sapp. 323, 327 (N.D. Ill. 1965), rev'd and remanded,
388 U.S. 365 (1967).
90 388 U.S. at 370-71. Schwinn, a "family-owned business," marketed most of its merchandise in "bicycle specialty shops," which also provided repairservices for the merchandise. Id. at
368-69. Through customer restrictions, Schwinn hoped to preclude sales to nonfranchised dealers, including discounters. See id. at 370-71. Schwinn's sanctioning policy for breach of the
customer restriction included "'cancellation"' of the violator's franchise. Id. at 371-72. For a
discussion of the vertical customer restrictions, see note 77 supra and accompanying text.
91 388 U.S. at 370-71. Schwinn not only restricted "[t]he number of franchised dealers in
any [particular] area" but, also "designated [the] location[s]" from which a dealer could market
Schwinn products. Id. For a discussion of vertical territorial restrictions, see note 77 supra and
accompanying text.
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In attempting to determine the legality of these restraints, the
Court examined the effects of Schwinn's plan on competition. 9 2 Initially, the Court noted the absence of any price-fixing in Schwinn's
scheme. 9 3 Furthermore, the Court found that Schwinn was neither a
"failing company" nor a "new entrant" into the bicycle market, inferring that these may be important considerations under the per se
rule. 9 4 The Court then proceeded to distinguish the forms of business arrangements arising under the Schwinn distribution program in
terms of sale and nonsale transactions.9 5 The outright sale transactions encumbered by the customer and territorial restraints were
found to violate the rule against restraints on alienation. 9 6 This
common law rule prohibited any restrictions on the resale of products
once the seller had relinquished title and dominion. 9 7 Since
Schwinn had failed to retain title and dominion over the merchandise
in the sale transactions, the Court found Schwinn was precluded from
restricting further disposition of its products by the purchaser. 9 8 The
92 388 U.S. at 372-82.
93 Id. at 373. For a discussion of the ramifications of those restrictions which are ancillary to

price-fixing, see note 84 supra and accompanying text..
94'388 U.S. at 374. Although the Court has not specifically held that "failing companies" or
"new entrants" are exceptions to the per se rule, the Court has suggested that these two situations may constitute viable exceptions. See id.; White Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S.
253, 263 (1963) (Court noted vertical territorial restrictions "may be .. . the only practicable
means a small company has for breaking into or staying in business."). For a discussion of failing
company and new entrant defenses, see generally, Bennett, supra note 77, at 1776-77; Note,
Newcomer Defenses: Reasonable Use of Tie-Ins, Franchises, Territorials, and Exclusives, 18
STAN. L. REV. 457 (1966); ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2,supra note 51, at 16.
95 388 U.S. at 377-80. The Court differentiated between sales in which "the manufacturer
parts with title, dominion or risk with respect to the article, and where he completely retains
ownership and risk of loss." Id. at 378-79. This distinction was initially proposed by the district
court below, which stated that sales where title, dominion and risk had passed necessitated a
per se rule with respect to territorial restraints on the resale of goods. See United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 342 (N.D. I11.
1965), rev'd and remanded, 388 U.S.
365 (1967).
96 388 U.S. at 380.
97Id. The rule against restraints on alienation is a property law concept having its origin in
the English common law. 2 COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 360 (Day ed.

1812). Initially, it was believed the rule would pr hibit unfair resale restrictions by merchants
on their products. Id. This rule was interpreted by the English courts, however, to prohibit
only those restraints which were unreasonable in light of their effect on competition. See
Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181, 24 Eng. Rep. 347 (1711). See also 388 U.S. at 391-92
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The ancient rule against restraints on alienation had also been applied
by the Supreme Court in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373
(1911), in which the Court invalidated an agreement between a medicine manufacturer and its
distributors and retailers to fix retail prices of the manufacturer's products. Id. at 404-05.
98 388 U.S. at 379-80. In making this ruling, the majority was apparently motivated by a
desire to maintain the freedom of businessmen to sell their products as they desired. See id. at
376-79. Justice Stewart, however, concurring in part and dissenting in part, disagreed that the
rule against restraints on alienation was the proper basis for the majority's holding. Id. at 391-
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Court noted, however, that ownership remained with Schwinn under
the Schwinn Plan, agency and consignment arrangements and therefore certain limitations on the economic freedom of retailers and distributors to dispose of the goods were not deemed violative of the
alienation rule. 9 9 Based on this distinction, the Court held that the
sale transactions under the Schwinn distribution program would be
viewed as per se illegal, while the legality of the nonsale transactions
would be decided under the rule of reason approach. 100
In pronouncing the sale transactions to be per se illegal, the
Court reasoned it would be "obviously destructive of competition" 101
to permit vertical restrictions on sale transactions where the manufacturer passed complete title to the distributor or retailer. In the opinion of the Court, restraints on resale should be limited to certain

93. Suggesting that the "antiquity" of the doctrine was not enough to compel its utilization,
Justice Stewart added that the doctrine "is not nearly so rigid as the Court implies." Id. at 391.
Consequently, Justice Stewart determined that the common law doctrine "is irrelevant to . ..
the effect of antitrust laws upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today." Id. at 392. Indeed, several commentators have agreed with Justice Stewart and consequently the Court's reliance upon the doctrine has received much criticism. See, e.g., Handler, The Twentieth Annual Antitrust Review, 53 VA. L. REv. 1667, 1684-86 (1967); Pollack,
Alternative Distribution Methods After Schwinn, 63 Nw. U. L. REV. 595, 601 (1968); Robinson,
Recent Antitrust Developments: 1974, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 243, 280 (1975). But see Louis, supra
note 77, at 276 n.6, 277-79. For further discussion of the Schwinn Court's usage of the restraints against alienation doctrine, see Posner, supra note 75, at 295-96; Comment, supra note
77, B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. at 1036-39.
99 388 U.S. at 380-81. Prior to Schwinn, the Court had used the agency-consignment arrangement as a basis of distinction. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co.,
220 U.S. 373, 400-04 (1911). However, in Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S.13 (1964), the
Court, again faced with a consignment arrangement, held that such a device could not be used
to circumvent the federal antitrust law. Id. at 17-18. Justice Stewart, dissenting in Schwinn,
feared that clever draftsmen would manipulate business arrangements to comply with the
Schwinn ruling in form but not in substance. See 388 U.S. at 393-94 (Stewart, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part). See generally Averill, supra note 77, at 68; Pollack, supra note 98, at
606-08; Comment, supra note 77, B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. at 1033-36, 1050-57; Comment, Vertical TerritorialRestraints and the Per Se Concept, 18 BUFFALO L. REV. 153, 160-63
(1969).
100 388 U.S. at 379-80. The sale-nonsale distinction made by the Court has met with sound
criticism by a number of authorities. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 98, at 1683-89; Pollack,
supra note 98, at 599-601, 606-08; Robinson, supra note 98, at 270-75. Professor Handler
summed up much of the criticism against the distinction by commenting that "[florm is exalted
over substance to a degree unparalleled in the history of antitrust." Handler, supra note 98, at
1684.
1o 388 U.S. at 379. The effect of vertical restraints on competition has been the subject of
much debate. Most commentators, however, have accepted the proposition that although intrabrand competition may be decreased by vertical restraints, overall competition may be enhanced by a concurrent increase in interbrand competition. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 56, at
430-52; Preston, supra note 74, at 508, 511-12; Zimmerman, Distribution Restrictions After
Sealy and Schwinn, 12 ANTITRUST BULL. 1181, 1184-87 (1967). But see Comanor, supra note
74, at 1422-36.
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exceptional circumstances, rather than encouraged.10 2 The Court,
however, cautioned that a total prohibition of vertical restraints
through adoption of an inclusive per se rule was also not warranted,
since such a bar would inhibit the ability of small businesses to compete with larger entities. 103 An additional concern was that a per se
rule might foster vertical integration, a situation where the manufacturer takes over some or all aspects of distribution or retailing,
thereby diminishing competition.'

102 388 U.S. at 379-80. The Court was particularly concerned with the possibility that "franchising and confinement of distribution" arrangements would be accepted as the norm rather
than the exception. Id. at 379.
103 Id. at 379-80. Although the Court did not want to establish an "inflexib[le]" rule applicable to vertical restraints, the reasoning suggested by the Court that such a ruling would disadvantage small businessmen has been criticized by at least one commentator. See id. at 379;
Handler, supra note 98, at 1687 n.96. Professor Handler has suggested that the agency, consignment, and Schwinn Plan arrangements, permissible under the Schwinn decision, could not
be economically utilized by small businessmen. Id. Acknowledging that consignment arrangements necessitate a large inventory, Handler noted that "[t]he financing of such an operation
will often be beyond the means of the smaller company." Id. Additionally, Handler stated that
agency and "Schwinn plan" programs would be "unworkable" since warehouses for local distribution would be needed. Id.
104 388 U.S. at 379-80. Subsequent to the Court's decision, Schwinn announced a plan to
vertically integrate the distribution aspects of the business by utilizing "company-owned sales
subsidiaries." R. Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW. 669, 685-87 (1968). This was precisely
the type of arrangement which the Court had hoped to avoid. See 388 U.S. at 380.
Lower courts have interpreted the Schwinn decision in a variety of ways, allowing distribution restrictions to be viewed under the rule of reason, regardless of the type of transaction,
where the circumstances of the case permitted such an interpretation. See Conment, supra
note 4 at 505-11. For example, the Third Circuit accepted a "dangerous product" exception to
the Schwinn rule in Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936-38 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 831 (1970). See also Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. United States, 449 F.2d 1374, 1380 (Ct.
Cl. 1971). However, a "unique product" exception was denied by the Tenth Circuit in Adolph
Coors Co. v. F.T.C., 497 F.2d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1105 (1975).
Another interpretation of Schwinn deemed " 'firm and resolute' " enforcement was necessary for
per se treatment. See Colorado Pump & Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637, 639 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Janel Sales Corp. v. Lanvin Parfums, Inc., 396 F.2d
398, 406-07 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 938 (1968). But see Response of Carolina, Inc. v.
Leasco Response, Inc., 537 F.2d 1307 (5th Cir. 1976). The "without -more" language of Schwinn
has also received various interpretations as to whether the Court was indicating that additional
factors constituting "more" would take the restraint out of the per se category. See Good Inv.
Promotions, Inc. v. Corning Glass Works, 493 F.2d 891, 893 (6th Cir. 1974); Tripoli Co. v.
Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932, 936 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831 (1970); Clairol Inc. v.
Cosmetics Plus, 130 N.J. Super. 81, 91-101, 325 A.2d 505, 510-15 (Ch. Div. 1974). See also
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (Supreme Court's use of the phrase "without
more" in dealing with resale price maintenance not given much significance); Note, supra note
73, 70 MICH. L. REV. at 626-27; ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note
51, at 11-12. Primary areas of responsibility have also been upheld by court decisions and
consent decrees as being beyond the reach of Schwinn. See, e.g., Kaiser v. General Motors
Corp., 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976), aff'd, 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Colorado Pump &'
Supply Co. v. Febco, Inc., 472 F.2d 637 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 987 (1973); Superior
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In Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,105 the Supreme
Court reconsidered the per se rule adopted in Schwinn for certain
Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. I11.
1972); United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. I11.
1968). But see Reed Bros. v. Monsanto
Co., 525 F.2d 486, 499-500 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1055 (1976); Hobart Bros.
Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894, 900 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923
(1973). Profit pass-over clauses have also gained approval of the courts since Schwinn. See, e.g.,
United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. I11.
1970), aff'd without opinion,
414 U.S. 801 (1973); Superior Bedding Co. v. Serta Assocs., Inc., 353 F. Supp. 1143 (N.D. I11.
1972).
1O 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Prior to Schwinn and Sylvania, the Supreme Court was faced with a location clause in
United States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127 (1966), in which General Motors elicited
promises from automobile dealers not to sell their product to discounters. Id. at 136. The Court
specifically deferred the question of the legality of the location clause since concerted, rather
than unilateral, action had been taken by the manufacturer and dealers to enforce the location
restriction. In the opinion of the Court, the concerted action constituted a conspiracy to foreclose market access to a particular group of sellers in violation of the Sherman Act. Id. at
139-40, 145. The majority relied upon United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960),
which had precluded manufacturers from refusing to sell to retailers who had deviated from the
suggested minimum resale prices when concerted action was involved. Id. at 45-46; see 384
U.S. 143-44.
Concurring in the General Motors decision, Justice Harlan pronounced that a manufacturer
should be permitted to refuse to sell to the dealers who failed to adhere to the suggested prices
only if unilateral action was utilized. Similarly, a location clause may be enforced unilaterally.
Id. at 148-49 (Harlan, J., concurring). In making these pronouncements, Justice Harlan relied
upon the 1919 decision of United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). 384 U.S. at
148-49 (Harlan, J., concurring). Under the "Colgate Doctrine," a manufacturer may unilaterally
"announce in advance the circumstances under which he will refuse to sell." 250 U.S. at 307.
Justice Harlan's view that the unilateral employment of a location clause may be reasonable was
subsequently re-enforced by the Schwinn case itself which had been remanded by the Supreme
Court for an entry of decree in accordance with the opinion. See United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564, 566 (N.D. I11.
1968). See also United States v. Arnold,
Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). Notwithstanding the Supreme Court opinion, the district
court recognized the ability of Schwinn to maintain location clauses in their franchise agree-.
ments. 291 F. Supp. at 566.
More recently, the Third and Tenth circuits have upheld location clauses. Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 530 F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976), affg 396 F. Supp. 33 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Salco
Cbrp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975). See also Sheldon Pontiac v.
Pontiac Motors Div., Gen. Motors Corp., 418 F. Supp. 1024 (D.N.J. 1976). Kaiser involved an
automobile dealership in which the dealer, for business reasons, no longer wished to remain at
the location at which he had been franchised by General Motors. 396 F. Supp. at 35. Kaiser
requested permission to relocate his dealership because the opening of a.new highway decreased sales at his location. Id. Refusing, General Motors contended the area requested was
already adequately serviced. Id. Kaiser then sued General Motors to have the location clause
declared invalid. Id. at 36. The court, however, in holding for General Motors, recognized the
right of the manufacturer to designate a specific location for retail marketing. Id. at 42. Similarly, the Salco Corporation and General Motors disagreed on a new location for a dealership
which resulted in a voluntary termination by Salco of the relationship. 517 F.2d at 570-71.
Finding the location clause significantly important to General Motors' franchise scheme and,
ultimately, the company's business interests, the court noted the restriction helped ensure the
"adequate coverage of a market" and, consequently, the "'economic viability of its dealerships."
Id. at 573.
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vertical customer and territorial restraints. 106 Sylvania's franchise
system involved a location restriction.1 0 7 This restriction was a vertical restraint which prohibited franchised products from being sold
from any location other than the specific location agreed upon by Sylvania and the franchised retailer, in this case, Continental. 10 8 This
location restriction was equated by the Court with the customer restriction considered in Schwinn.1 09 In effect, both the location and
customer restrictions could deny the dealer the freedom to sell his
merchandise in any manner he wished. 110 Moreover, Schwinn's customer restriction and Sylvania's location restriction were both applicable -after title to the goods had passed from the manufacturer to the
distributor or retailer."' The Court noted that it was immaterial
that one restriction was directed at customers while the other concerned territory and therefore concluded that, since the "intent and
competitive impact" of the restrictions were alike, they should be
evaluated according to the same standards. 1 12 Accordingly, the
Court found the per se rule in Schwinn would be applicable to a

106 433 U.S. at 51-57.

The Ninth Circuit had not reconsidered Schwinn because the court felt Schwinn was distinguislable from Sylvania on a number of significant poi-nts. 537 F.2d at 988-92. First, the
court relied upon the fact that the Sylvania restriction was on the "vendor" rather than the
"vendee." Id. at 990. Additionally, Vie court found the restrictions resulted in different effects
on competition. Id. Finally, the court determined that the market shares involved in both
Schwinn and Sy!vania were too dissimilar to rely upon the Schwinn analysis as controlling. See
id. at 991.
107 433 U.S. at 42-59.

108 Id. at 46. For a discussion of the legality of location restrictions prior to Sylvania, see

note 105 supra. See also Comment, supra note 36; Comment, supra note 77; Note, Antitrust
Law-Enforcement of Dealer-Location Clauses Declared Per Se Illegal, 53 N.C. L. REV. 775
(1975); Note, Antitrust-Vertical Restraints-Schwinn "Per Se" Doctrine Extended to Location
Clauses, 53 TEX. L. REV. 127 (1974).

109 433 U.S. at 46. The Schwinn Court had also considered both territorial restrictions and
customer restrictions as subject to the same analysis. See 388 U.S. at 378-79, 382.
110 433 U.S. at 46. The majority rejected any distinctions proffered by either the Ninth Circuit or Justice White's concurrence since the distinctions relied upon were not found to be
relevant to the Schwinn Court's analysis of vertical restraints. Id. at 46-47 n.12. First, the
Sylvania Court pointed out that the Schwinn Court had not differentiated the standards for a
per se or rule of reason analysis on the basis of the impact of the restriction on intrabrand
competition. See id. Additionally, in Sylvania the Court suggested that contrary to the reasoning of both the Ninth Circuit and Justice White, Schwinn's products, as in Sylvania, were the
equivalent of other manufacturers in the market, thereby ruling out any difference between the
two cases based on consumer preference for a particular manufacturer's product. See id. See
also 433 U.S. at 63; United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967); GTE Sylvania Inc. v. Continental T.V. Inc., 537 F.2d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 1976). But see United States v.
Arnold, Schwinn &.Co., 237 F. Supp. 323, 335 (N.D. I11. 1965).
:11 433 U.S. at 45-46.
12

Id. at 46.
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determination of the legality of the location restriction in the Sylvania
franchise arrangement. 113
In light of this, the Court determined that a re-evaluation of the
Schwinn holding was necessary. 114 The distinction made in Schwinn
between sale and nonsale transactions was found to be an inadequate
basis for deciding whether a per se rule or rule of reason should
apply. 115 The Court indicated that this distinction neither served the
purpose of the Sherman Act, that of safeguarding competition, nor
did it take into consideration relevant economic factors. 116 In the
opinion of the Court, economic aspects such as market impact and
effect on competition should be appraised when evaluating the legality of vertical territorial and customer restraints.1iT
The Court recognized that in Schwinn an attempt had been
made to accommodate the dual market effect of the restraint, possible
increased interbrand competition and probable decreased intrabrand
competition, by mandating a per se approach for sales transactions."1 8 In spite of this, however, the distinction made between sale
and nonsale transactions was ineffective primarily becAuse it failed to
demonstrate any economic impact. 119 Therefore, the Court refused
to employ the per se standard adopted in Schwinn for vertical territo-

113 Id. at 47-48, 51-54.

*

Id. at 47. The Court acknowledged Schwinn had been "an abrupt and largely unexplained
departure from White Motor . . . where only four years earlier the Court had refused to endorse a per se rule for vertical restrictions." Id. (citation omitted). In light of the apparent
absence of a rational explanation for the Schwinn analysis and the consequent confusion of the
law in this area, the Court felt compelled to re-define the parameters of legality as to vertical
restraints by re-evaluating Schwinn under the traditional guidelines of Northern Pacific which
the Court had used to determine the propriety of a per se rule. See id. at 47-51.
'15 Id. at 57. The sale-nonsale distinction was, in part, premised upon the rule against restraints on alienation. 388 U.S. at 380. Citing numerous commentaries critical of the use of the
rule "as both a misreading of legal history and a perversion of antitrust analysis," the Court in
Sylvania rejected Schwinn's reliance on the rule as faulty since "'the state of the common law
400 or even 100 years ago is irrelevant to the issue before use: the effect of the antitrust laws
upon vertical distributional restraints in the American economy today."' 433 U.S. at 53 n.21
(quoting 388 U.S. at 392 (Stewart, J., dissenting)). For a discussion of the sale-nonsale transaction analysis in Schwinn, see notes 95-101 supra and accompanying text.
"I See 433 U.S. at 49-57. The Court determined that the Schwinn Court excluded nonsale
transactions from the per se rule not because of a fear of detriment to intrabrand competition or
hope of increased interbrand competition, but rather because the Schwinn Court had not
wanted to prohibit all distributional restraints and believed a total per se rule could be harmful
since it would be "too 'inflexibl[e]."' Id. at 54 (citation omitted).
117 Id. at 54-59.
55s Id. at 52-54. The Sylvania Court suggested that in Schwinn,
the Court had failed to
present any "analytical support" upon which to reasonably base a different standard for vertical
restraints which depended on the sale or nonsale form of the transaction. Id. at 54.
119 Id. at 53-54.
114
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rial and customer restrictions and instead chose to return to the standards set out in Northern Pacific to determine the propriety of a per
se rule for vertical customer and territorial restraints. 120
Focusing on the actual economic impact of the restriction, the
Northern Pacific Court had identified two criteria for assessing the
need for a per se rule. 12 1 These factors were the "pernicious effect"
of the restraint on competition and the "redeeming value," is any,
that accrued from the restriction.' 2 2 The Court, applying these factors in Sylvania, found that there was no demonstration that vertical
restraints had an inherent deleterious effect on competition.1 2 3 The
Court also noted that vertical restraints ordinarily have a "redeeming"
aspect, since they foster interbrand competition. l2 4
The Court analyzed the independent, yet dual effects on the
market which generally result from the use of vertical restraintsthat of decreasing intrabrand competition while increasing interbrand
competition. 125 Intrabrand competition decreases because vertical
restrictions provide a means by which the manufacturer may limit the
number of available dealers from whom a consumer may purchase a
specific manufacturer's product. 1 2 6 However, the Court noted that
this decrease in intrabrand competition is not always absolute, since
consumers may have the option of traveling to other dealerships or
may substitute comparable products of other manufacturers. 1 27 In
addition, the Court found that manufacturers generally will retain
some level of intrabrand competition to encourage a higher volume of
8
sales, resulting in greater profit.12

120 Id. at 54-59.

121Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1957).
122 Id.
Since the Schwinn Court had not utilized the Northern Pacific rationale for adopting per se
rules, the Sylvania Court determined that it was necessary to re-evaluate Schwinn under the
standards for per se rules imposed by Northern Pacific. 433 U.S. at 51. For a discussion of the

Northern Pacific decision, see notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
12 433 U.S. at 50-58.

14 Id. at 54-56. Maintaining that vertical restraints may permit "certain efficiencies in
distribution," the Court stated that "'redeeming virtues' are implicit in every decision sustaining

vertical restrictions under the rule of reason." Id. at 54; see Preston, supra note 74, at 511. For
further discussion of the "redeeming" economic aspects of vertical restraints see notes 129-35
infra and accompanying text.
125 433 U.S. at 51-52 & n.19.

126 Id. at 54. In regard to vertical restrictions, the Sylvania Court was particularly concerned
with the location clause which the Court described as an effective limitation on the number of
dealers which could realistically serve a particular area of consumers. Id.
127 Id.
121 See id. at 56 & n.24. See generally Bork, supra note 56, at 403.
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While intrabrand competition may be decreased, vertical restraints increase competition at the manufacturers' level, since such
restrictions allow for a higher level of "marketing efficiency." 129 By
giving dealers a designated area in which to develop their business
without the pressures of intrabrand competition, the manufacturer is
able to attract competent and aggressive retailers for his product
1 30
while the dealer is further encouraged by higher profit margins.
The "free rider" situation, which occurs when a dealer's promotional
service activities benefit nearby dealers who are thereby able to escape these costs, is also avoided. 131 The manufacturer may therefore
benefit from increased promotional activities and improved service
and repair facilities provided by its dealers. 132 Consumers may also
benefit by receiving greater information about the product while having access to more reliable service and repair facilities when
needed.1 33 Moreover, the manufacturer may be in a better position
to protect himself against consumer product liability and warranty
litigation since he has retained some control over disposition of the
product.134 The net result is that interbrand competition is stimulated by manufacturer and dealer activities which are fostered under
the imposition of certain vertical restraints.135

129 433 U.S. at 54-55 & n.23. Several commentators have also theorized that vertical restraints may result in increased interbrand competition. See, e.g., Bork, supra note 56, at 42952; Posner, supra note 75, at 283-85; Preston, supra note 74, at 507-12. See generally ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 51, at 38-40; Zimmerman, supra note 101, at

1185. But see Comanor, supra note 74, at 1427-38.
130 See 433 U.S. at 55; Preston, supra note 74, at 511.
131 See 433 U.S. at 55. Referring to the "free rider" problem as a "market[ing] imperfection,"
the Court found that competition alone would not necessarily increase the amount of promotional and service activities offered by dealers, even though the dealers would all benefit to a
greater extent if such services were offered uniformly rather than not at all. Id. For a general
discussion of the "free rider" situation, see Bork, supra note 56, at 430-38; Posner, supra note

-75, at 284-85.
132 433 U.S. at 55. See, e.g.,

Bork, supra note 56, at 435-36; Posner, supra note 75, at

283-85.
133 See 43 U.S. at 55; Bork, supra note 56, at 435-39.
134 433 U.S. at 55 n.23. For a listing of the applicable federal statutes, see id. The "safety

responsibilities" of the manufacturer and possible subsequent liability were concerns of the
Third Circuit in Tripoli Co. v. Wella Corp., 425 F.2d 932 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 831
(1970), wherein the court sustained the validity of a customer restriction where the product

could cause dangerous reactions to customers resulting in a products liability suit. 425 F.2d at
938-39.
135 See 433 U.S. at 54-56.
In light of the potential net competitive benefit obtainable from vertical restraints, the
Court determined that the rule of reason would be the proper analysis under which to determine the legality of a vertical restraint. Id. at 57-59. The Court, however, declared that should
a particular vertical restraint acquire a "'pernicious effect on competition' or ... [a] 'lack [of]
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Justice White, in a concurring opinion, determined that Schwinn
need not have been overruled since Sylvania could have been distinguished. 13 6 Basing his conclusion, in part, on the fact that the type
of restraint involved in Sylvania differed significantly in both "intent and competitive impact" from the restraints considered in
Schwinn,13 7 Justice White stated that any potential harm to intrabrand competition resulting from a location restriction is neither as
138
certain nor as great as that caused by a customer restriction.
First, the prevention of sales to unfranchised dealers, including discounters, effectuated by a customer restriction was found by Justice
White to stifle intrabrand price competition.1 39 Furthermore, unlike
a customer restriction, Justice White recognized that a location restriction does not significantly limit the retailers' "freedom" of disposal of goods, signali.ng a "significant difference" to the impact on
competition. 140
Justice White also perceived a lesser limitation on interbrand
competition resulting from a location restriction. 141 Sylvania had
only a small share of a market dominated by other television manufacturers, while Schwinn enjoyed a greater percentage of the market as
well as a national reputation.1 42 Justice White felt the Schwinn per

. . . any redeeming virtue,"' the application of a per se analysis to that particular restraint might
be justified. Id. at 58-59 (quoting Northern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5).
136 433 U.S. at 59.
137 Id. at 60.
138 Id. at 60-62.
139 Id. at 60-62. Concerned with the decrease in intrabrand price competition when
discounters are foreclosed from purchasing goods from franchised dealers, Justice White recognized a potential increase in intrabrand price competition under a location restriction. In the
opinion of Justice White, an already franchised dealer could profit from lowering prices and
selling in large quantities to discounters, thereby increasing its own sales volume. See id. at 60.
140 Id. at 61-62. Citing recent cases and commentators which have tried to define
the
breadth of the Schwinn rule, Justice White stated that the Schwinn decision did not modify the
validity of location restrictions since the Schwinn per se analysis was inapplicable to such restrictions. Id. at 59, 62-63; see note 105 supra. See also Kaiser v. General Motors Corp., 530
F.2d 964 (3d Cir. 1976); Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 291 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. I11. 1968); McLaren, Territorial and Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Retail Prices and Refusals to Deal, 37
ANTITRUST L. J. 137, 144-45 (1968); Pollack, supra note 98, at 603; Robinson, supra note 98, at

278.
141 433 U.S. at 63-66.
142 Id.
at 63-65. Speaking in terms of "product differentiation and market share," Justice
White found the "market power" held by Schwinn (22.5%) and Sylvania (1% to 2%) in their
generic markets was vastly different. Id. at 63--64. Part of Schwinn's market power was a result
of consumer preference for Schwinn products-a preference which Sylvania products did not
enjoy. Id. Justice White stated that this preference, which protected Schwinn from interbrand
competition, also could have provided discounters with an opportunity to profit had it not been
for Schwinn's customer restrictions. Id. at 63-64.
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se rule may be inapplicable to a manufacturer similar to Sylvania,
holding a "'precarious' position" in the industry.' 4 3 In this situation
many substitute products are available to the consumer. 1 44 Furthermore, when a manufacturer either desires "to enter a new market" or holds a relatively small market share, vertical restraints were
found by Justice White to be valuable in strengthening interbrand
competition. 14 5 Justice White noted prior decisions in which "minimal market power" had represented an important factor considered
by the Court in its determination to apply a rule of reason standard
rather than a per se rule. 146 Therefore, Justice White concluded that
the Court should not abandon a per se rule where strong market
power is present, but rather should apply a rule of reason standard in
situations where a manufacturer has only a small share of the market. 147
The sale-nonsale distinction in Schwinn was found by Justice
White to be a reasonable basis for determining when a per se rule
should be applied. 14 8 Justice White noted that in making this distinction the Court was primarily concerned with allowing
businessmen freedom to dispose of their goods as they desired, rather
than with the intrabrand-interbrand effects on competition. 14a This
distinction was still valid since precedent had shown the Court to be
interested in any limitation on the ability of businessmen to function
freely in the market.15 0 Therefore, Justice White suggested that the
143 Id. at 64-65.
144 Id. The availability of substitute products and consumer preference for those products
reflects the market power of the manufacturer. ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2,
supra note 51, at 62-63. This concept, known as product differentiation, is a factor demonstrating the ability of the manufacturer to effectively compete in the market. Id. "Simply stated,
product differentiation is the degree to which developed consumer loyalty to a particular product will enable sellers to charge a premium price for that product above that charged for substitute products without losing substantial sales volume." Id. at 62 n.250; see note 142 supra.
145 Id. at 64-66.

146 id. at 65-66. As indicated by Justice White, market power has traditionally been a factor
used by the Court in antitrust cases to limit the reach of per se rules. Id.; See, e.g., United
States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 366 (1963) (legality of mergers are dependent
upon market shares); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1958) (per se
rule applicable to tie-in arrangements only where there is "sufficient economic power"); United
States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559-61 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd per curian, 365
U.S. 567 (1961) ("infant industries" are not within the per se rule). See generally Note supra
note 94.
147 433 U.S. at 66.
148 Id. at 66-69.
149 id. at 66-67.
150 Id. at 67-68; see, e.g., United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365, 379-80
(1966); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951); United
States v. General Elec. Co., 272 U.S. 476, 487-89 (1926); United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
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majority should not have so easily dispensed with this concern, even
if "relevant economic impact" provided a stronger principled basis
upon which to determine the legality of vertical restraints. 151
Finally, Justice White determined that the test of "relevant
economic impact" impliedly questioned the firmly established per se
rule for vertical price restraints. 152 He noted that the reasons advanced for the majority's emphasis on economic analysis in determining the validity of vertical nonprice restraints were equally applicable
to vertical price restraints. 153 Moreover, Justice White suggested
that reliance solely on an economic analysis would provide justification for resale price maintenance in situations involving a new entrant
into a market, a "free rider" problem or a desire to increase dealer
154
promotional and service activities.
Justice White concluded that a more narrow holding based on
the facts presented would be more appropriate than an outright overruling of Schwinn. 155 The rule of reason should govern location restrictions where the manufacturer maintains only a small share of the
market if the "competitive impact" of the restraint is minimal.156
Further, the Court need not dispense with the sale-nonsale distinction in order to decide that a rule of reason for location clauses is
57
necessary. 1
In Sylvania, the Court determined that the legality of vertical
8
nonprice restraints would be ascertained under the rule of reason. 15
U.S. 300, 307 (1919); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 410-11
(1911); See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 51, at 82-83, 87-91,

96-97; Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 422,
427-36 (1965).
151 433 U.S. at 68-69.
152 Id. at 69-70.

Id.
See id. at 70.
155 Id. at 71. Justice White believed a moderate stance was appropriate in light of the legitimate distinctions between Sylvania and Schwinn proffered by the Ninth Circuit. Referring to
the majority's quick "dispos[al]" of the Ninth Circuit decision below, Justice White stated that
[t]o reach out to overrule one of this Court's recent interpretations of the Sherman
Act, after such a cursory examination of the necessity for doing so, is surely an
affront to the principle that considerations of stare decisis are to be given particularly strong weight in the area of statutory construction.
Id. at 60 (citations omitted).
153
154

156 Id.
157 Id. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented, indicating only that the per se rule adopted
in Schwinn should not be abandoned. Id.
558 Id. at 59. The Court clearly stated that the application of the per se rule to vertical price
restraints was not re-examined in the Sylvania decision. Id. at 51 n.18. The Court would only
note that, despite some commentators' analysis that the reasons for imposing vertical nonprice
restraints may be the same as for imposing price restraints, "significant differences . . . could
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To reach this conclusion, the Court overruled Schwinn 159 despite indications by Justice White that a viable basis upon which to distinguish the cases existed. 160 The Sylvania Court found the Schwinn
analysis and per se rule unworkable due to its inability to accommodate both the potential positive and negative effects of vertical restraints. 161 Beneficial business practices were consequently prohibited by some courts.1 6 2 Additionally, in prescribing the per se rule
for vertical restraints, the Court in Schwinn failed to utilize important
economic factors such as market power variations and the differing
effects on interbrand competition.163 The Sylvania majority, however, found no insurmountable distinctions between the two cases
which could have prevented a re-analysis of the Schwinn per se
rule. 16 4 Consequently, in Sylvania, the per se rule of Schwinn was
abandoned in favor of the rule of reason approach which provides for

easily justify different treatment." Id. For a discussion of vertical price restraints, see notes
169-70 infra and accompanying text.
159 Id. at 58.
160 Id. at 59-64. For a discussion of the distinctions between Schwinn and Sylvania according

to Justice White, see notes 136-38 supra and accompanying text.
161 Id. at 52-57. The Schwinn per se rule, based upon the sale-nonsale distinction made by
the Court, allowed distribution restrictions on nonsale transactions alone. 388 U.S. at 379.
Manufacturers dealing in sales transactions, however, were unable to gain the advantages that
distribution restrictions brought such as increased investment, promotion of goods and the provision of service and repair facilities resulting in a concentration on interbrand competition by
the retailer. See 433 U.S. at 56; Note, supra note 77, at 144. The Sylvania Court recognized
this problem, stating that "[c]apital requirements and administrative expenses may prevent
smaller firms from using the exception for nonsale transactions." Id.; see Note, supra note 77, at
143-44.
162 In its broadest sense, the Schwinn per se rule proscribed distribution restrictions where a
sale agreement, rather than agency or consignment arrangement was in force. See 388 U.S. at
379. Consequently, vertical restraints such as customer restrictions and exclusive distributorships have been invalidated under the Schwinn holding. See, e.g., United States v. Glaxo
Group, Ltd., 302 F. Supp. 1, 8-10 (D.D.C. 1969) (customer restrictions invalidated despite
consumer health and safety justifications); Sherman v. Weber Dental Mfg. Co., 285 F. Supp.
114, 116 (E.D. Pa. 1968) (territorial restraint found illegal under Schwinn since straight sales
arrangement employed). The Schwinn per se rule has also been construed very narrowly by
lower federal courts. For a discussion of exceptions to the per se rule, see note 104 supra. See
also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 2, supra note 51, at 12-25; Note, supra note
77, at 131-34.
163 433 U.S. at 52-54. Professor Posner has suggested that, in part, the Schwinn per se rule
based on sale-nonsale distinctions reflected economic beliefs of that time. Posner, The Rule of
Reason and the Economic Approach, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1977). Specifically, it was
thought by some economists that a distribution restriction such as in Schwinn would "reinforce
an image of superior quality that would reduce the substitutability of other . . . brands and thus
increase . . . monopoly power in [that] . . . market." Id. Additionally, it was not a widely

accepted belief that advertising led to valuable increased product information which therefore
downplayed the value of vertical restraints as incentives to promotional activities. Id. at 4-5.
16

433 U.S. at 46-47; see notes 109-13 supra and accompanying text.
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the legality of those vertical restraints which are ultimately beneficial
65
to competition. '
Economic impact was found by the Sylvania Court to be the
most prudent test to use in determining the legality of vertical restraints. 1 66 Accordingly, the Court recognized that any possible future per se rule devised for a specific vertical restraint inust be premised upon the restriction's "demonstrable economic effect." 167 This
test encompasses a balancing of the potential benefits of the restraint
to interbrand competition with the injury to intrabrand competition
to determine whether overall competition, interbrand, has been enhanced to a sufficient extent by the particular restraint. 168 Although
the Court specifically declared that this analysis leaves unaffected the
long established per se rule for vertical price restraints,' 6 9 the
economic impact analysis of Sylvania leaves open the possibility of
future legitimization of such restraints. 170

165 433 U.S. at 58-59.

166 Id. at 57-59. Endorsing economics as a means to determine competitive effects, the
Sylvania Court stated that "[c]ompetitive economies have social and political as well as
economic advantages, but an antitrust policy divorced from market considerations would lack
any objective benchmarks." Id. at 53 n.21 (citation omitted). Professor Posner believes that the

decision hails "the new importance of economics" in antitrust analysis since the Court has
acknowledged the lack of an economic basis for the Schwinn decision and had adopted a rule
which is based on economic analysis. See Posner, supra note 163, at 12-13.
167 433 U.S. at 58-59. In this way the Court can decide on a one-by-one basis whether the
particular restraint falls within the per se standards of Northern Pacific. For a discussion of
these standards, see notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
168 See 433 U.S. at 54-57. Professor Posner suggests that in the future the Court may redefine the standards for the legality of restraints in areas such as tie-ins and maximum resale
pricing. Posner, supra note 163, at 10-12. Posner based his comments upon the language in
Sylvania which points to the primacy of interbrand competition. Id.; see 433 U.S. at 52 n.19,
54-57. The free-rider concept was suggested by Posner to be another reason as to why the
Court may reconsider per se rules in other areas. Posner, supra note 163, at 10-11. Free-riding
undercuts the incentive for retailers to provide essential services to consumers such as repairs.
Id. The free-rider concept, easily seen in the context of distribution restrictions, also may affect
tie-ins since franchisers may utilize tie-ins to "assur[e] quality control and product and service
uniformity." Id. at 11-12.
169 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
170 See id. at 54-59. Although the law has traditionally separated vertical price and nonprice
restraints because they involve different policy considerations, see id. at 51 n.18, the Sylvania
Court's reliance on a "purely economic approach" implicitly challenges the rationale for the per
se rule for vertical price restraints. 433 U.S. at 69-70 (White, J., concurring). See Posner, supra
note 163, at 7-10. The economic and policy considerations regarding nonprice restraints are
very similar to those of vertical price restraints. See 433 U.S. at 69 (White, J., concurring).
Posner, supra note 84, at 286-99; Bork, supra note 56, at 396-464. Vertical price-fixing, like
other vertical restraints, results in economic efficiency which promotes increased product output. See 433 U.S. at 70 (White, J.,concurring). A byproduct of this process is greater consumer

protection since advertising and service repair facilities increase. See id. Although the Court's
economic analysis appears viable for both vertical nonprice as well as price restraints, however,
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The Sylvania decision provides a workable standard for both the
courts and the business community to determine the legality of vertical distribution arrangements. The rule of reason standard will clearly
allow restraints, such as location clauses, to be implemented as long
as interbrand competition is fostered thereby that standard, in conjunction with the economic impact analysis should provide a viable
framework of review for determining the per se status of future restraints based upon competition-the goal of the Sherman Act.
Maureen A. Farquhar

it has stipulated that the analysis is only applicable to
id. at 51 n.18. Consequently, the Court has provided
apply an economic impact analysis on the basis of fact
circumstances, such as failing company and newcomer
vertical price restraint.

the evaluation of nonprice restraints. See
a doctrine that may lead lower courts to
differentiations from Sylvania and special
situations, to determine the validity of a

